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Structured Abstract 
Purpose: Investors are now able to analyse more noise-free news to inform their trading 
decisions than ever before. Their expectation that more information means better performance 
is not supported by previous psychological experiments which argue that too much 
information actually impairs performance. This study examines whether the degree of 
information explicitness improves stock market performance.  
Design/methodology/approach: An experiment is conducted in a computer laboratory to 
examine a trading simulation manipulated from a real market-shock. Participants’ 
performance efficiency and effectiveness are measured separately.  
Findings: The results indicate that the explicitness of information neither improves nor 
impairs participants’ performance effectiveness from the perspectives of returns, share and 
cash positions, and trading volumes. However, participants’ performance efficiency is 
significantly affected by information explicitness.  
Originality/value: The novel approach and findings of this research add to our knowledge of 
the impact of information explicitness on the quality of decision making in a financial market 
environment.  
Keywords: explicitness of information, performance effectiveness, performance efficiency, 
individual investors, experimental finance. 
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1. Introduction 
To survive in the stock markets, individual investors struggle to interpret the information 
delivered by listed companies, the media, and rumours. Ambitious managers are prone to 
make their judgements based on how a piece of information is disclosed (Skinner, 1994; 
Kasznik and Lev, 1995). Rumours from online chat boards are also informative in some cases 
(Antweiler and Frank, 2004; Clarkson et al., 2006), while regulators have acted to eliminate 
information asymmetries from financial markets for several decades by improving regulatory 
and encouraging voluntary disclosures. Together with the rapid development of 
communication technology, individual investors, if they wish, are now able to collect a range 
of information to support their decisions. However, does more information always mean 
better performance for individual investors? According to previous studies, the answer is not 
definitive.  
This paper addresses the question of whether individual investors would benefit from 
analysing explicit information about an uncertain event in a stock market. It is based on an 
experimental stock market in which all information is noise-free and participants have news 
about the same unexpected event but at only two levels of explicitness (implicit and explicit). 
More precisely, participants face a negative event arising from an accident which is 
unexpected and can potentially have negative effects on share prices and on the manipulated 
company’s long-term operating performance. For some participants, who are selected 
randomly, relevant situations are explained by a piece of news which only states the objective 
facts of the accident in a general manner (implicit information). The other participants are 
informed by another piece of news which includes not only the objective facts but also several 
accurate analysts’ forecasts about the effects of the accident on the manipulated company’s 
strategic choices (explicit information). The experiment’s results are analysed to examine 
whether participants, who act as individual investors, could realise better performances when 
they are informed by explicit information than by implicit information regarding an uncertain 
situation in an informationally efficient stock market.  
2. Literature Review 
Better information – which means more accurate, relevant, and timely information – is 
believed to promote market efficiency and to help investors to realise better performance 
(Ackert et al., 2002). Regulators have not successfully removed information asymmetries from 
financial markets (Aboody and Kasznik, 2000; Kothari et al., 2008; Ivashina and Sun, 2011) 
so that investors have to make decisions according to information at differing levels of both 
quantity and quality. Inconsistent with regulators’ optimistic expectations, several studies 
show that more information is not always better (Huber et al., 2008; Joyce, 2008). In the 
majority of previous studies, “better information” is usually defined as a larger quantity of 
relevant information about the subject which is under investigation. However, the experiment 
presented in this paper does not examine the relationship between the quality of information 
(relevant versus noisy information) and investors’ performance. This variable is controlled by 
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excluding noise from experimental news. Instead, it is the potential interaction between the 
quantity of noise-free information and investors’ performance that is analysed. The core 
question addressed by this trading experiment is whether information explicitness affects 
investors’ decision-making processes and their decision-implementing processes. In this 
context, although additional information intrinsically has a positive marginal value, the extra 
costs expended by searching for and analysing it might eventually drive investors’ returns 
down, theoretically, to the average level. Accordingly, in this experiment, participants in both 
groups contribute the same amount of resources, both physically and mentally, to collecting 
information concerning a negative event that occurs. To control their costs of collecting 
information, all relevant information about the manipulated market-shock is provided to 
participants directly. They only need to collect envelopes from an experimenter and open 
them when they are allowed to read the news. They do not have the time or access to search 
for extra information by themselves. 
Besides the increase in costs, the negative relationship between the quantity of relevant 
information and investors’ performance might also be explained by their limited information 
processing capabilities. Because of this limitation, psychologists believe that the relative 
information load, rather than the absolute quantity of information, is crucial in determining 
how efficiently decision makers can process information (Schroder et al., 1967). There should 
be an optimal level of information load, at which a decision maker’s performance is also 
optimised (Eppler and Mengis, 2004). Before this optimal point (information underload), a 
decision maker should benefit from an increase in the quantity of relevant information. After 
this point (information overload), the decision maker starts to be disadvantaged by increasing 
relevant information.  
From another perspective, the quantity of relevant information – for example concerning 
an uncertain event – could increase because more repeated information and/or more diversified 
information is available in the stock market. Repeated and diversified information do not drive 
a decision-maker’s decision quality in the same direction. According to Iselin (1988), repeated 
information, by increasing the representativeness of an event, positively affects decision quality, 
while diversified information negatively affects decision time but not decision quality (Iselin, 
1989). Accordingly, in this experiment, implicit information is unpacked into its 
subcomponents (explicit information) so that one of the potential outcomes, which is also the 
final strategy chosen by the manipulated company, is emphasised by repetition supported by 
various credible reasons. The quantity of noise-free information in a piece of news is defined 
as the level of explicitness in this study. Two levels of information explicitness – implicit 
information and explicit information – are tested by this experiment. Because participants 
only trade one stock and there is only one market-shock which might affect share prices 
unexpectedly, participants’ information processing loads are expected not to reach the 
overload level. The participants who control the detailed information (explicit information) 
are thus expected to outperform those who analyse general objective information (implicit 
information). 
Extending previous studies in this area that measure investors’ performance mainly by 
their returns or risk-adjusted returns, in this paper investors’ trading-related decisions are also 
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tested from several other perspectives when they face different levels of information 
explicitness concerning an uncertain event. For example: the time that they spend on making 
decisions to enter their first orders, the directions of their orders as reactions to an 
unanticipated event, and the volume traded in their first post-market-shock order. More 
importantly, this experiment is conducted via a trading simulation trying to manipulate what 
might really occur in a stock market, from market performance to investors’ psychological 
pressures. Share price movements mimic the performance of BP, a real company listed on the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE). Additionally, the shocking story tested is a replica of a real 
accident that happened on one of BP’s manufacturing platforms in the Gulf of Mexico. 
Besides reconstructing the market situation when the news of BP’s accident broke, 
participants’ emotional pressures are simulated to capture what they might suffer in reaction 
to BP’s story. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Trading Rules – Market, Orders Execution, and Investors 
This trading experiment is operated in a manipulated single-stock equity market which is 
supported by a trading simulation developed especially for this experiment. There are several 
trading rules in this manipulated market, based on which the trading environment is made less 
complex. The manipulated market itself is leverage-free. Participants cannot borrow money or 
shares, which means that they can buy additional shares (sell shares) if and only if they have 
enough cash to pay for them (they have enough shares in their account to be sold). In this 
leverage-free market, the risk caused by price volatility borne by participants is not magnified. 
Therefore, participants do not need to allocate their limited information processing 
capabilities to consider that, for instance, when the leverage is ten times, if the share price 
decreases by 10% they would lose all their investment. Participants are expected to shoulder 
lower levels of pressure in a leverage-free than in a leveraged market. However, to fulfil their 
potential purchasing or selling requirements at the very beginning of the experiment, 
participants are given 10,000 shares and £100,000 cash in their initial accounts. They have 
limited time to translate their forecasts about the uncertain event into actions and they are not 
allowed to transfer any shares before or after the permitted trading periods. Last but not least, 
this manipulated market complies with the EMH, according to which market information will 
be reflected immediately in prices when it becomes publicly available. 
[Take in Figure 1 here] 
Regarding the methods which participants can use to trade in this manipulated market, 
they have two choices. Participants are able to purchase or sell shares by placing either market 
orders or limit orders. Market orders allow participants to purchase or sell shares immediately 
at the latest market price. The trading simulation executes a market order at the first price after 
it is entered. Limit orders allow participants to purchase or sell shares at a specified price. The 
simulation executes a sell (buy) limit order when the market price is equal to or higher (lower) 
than the required sale (purchase) price. In this experiment, another difference between a 
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market order and a limit order is the chance to correct previous decisions. Once a market 
order is entered into the market, it is executed immediately. However, participants are able to 
cancel a limit order before it is executed if they believe that the price is going against their 
previous expectations. Participants, as individual investors, act as price takers rather than price 
makers and cannot observe the decisions by other participants. Therefore, the share price 
moves according to a pre-set price series, as shown in Figure 1. Detailed information about 
this price trend will be discussed in section III.2. They are informed only by the three pieces 
of news released during the experiment and the historic price trend. 
3.2 Participants and Procedures 
Fifty-four postgraduate students from the ICMA Centre, Henley Business School, 
University of Reading, UK, are equally and randomly divided into two groups (IMGroup, 
which is given only packed information and EXGroup, which is given unpacked information). 
Their average age is 23.4 and 61% of them are male. These students receive systematic 
training sessions about how to trade in security markets during their study. The simulation that 
participants use to trade in their training sessions and the one developed for this experiment 
are fundamentally the same. Additionally, this experiment is conducted at the end of the term, 
when they are expected to have sufficient knowledge about how to properly analyse the 
information released by the media during the experiment and to be able to make forecasts 
about uncertain future price performance according to their analysis, rather than betting 
randomly. 
This experiment is composed of four stages, which are the introduction to the experiment, 
the first trading period, a short break, and the second trading period. At the very beginning of 
the experiment, three letters are handed out to participants. These letters are the introduction 
to the experiment and the trading simulation, News A (Appendix I) which is released at the 
beginning of the first trading period, and News B (Appendix II) which is released during the 
short break between two trading periods. News A and News B are sealed in envelopes so that 
participants cannot read them until they are allowed to open the envelopes. News C, which 
tells participants that Company SDX has decided to cancel the previously declared £2 
dividend, is disclosed one minute before the end of the experiment so that participants are also 
completely shielded from this news until then. 
Step 1: Introduction to the trading stimulation 
Before handing out the letters and loading the trading simulation, an experimenter 
outlines the purposes of the experiment, which is to observe individual investors’ trading 
behaviour in stock markets. The experimenter also informs participants that three letters will 
be distributed but they should not open any of them until they are told to do so. After 
distributing the envelopes, participants are guided to load the trading simulation on their 
computers. Then they are required to open only the envelope which is labelled 
“INTRODUCTION”. They have three minutes to read this letter which contains 350 words in 
total. Following that, the experimenter explains how to trade with the trading simulation, the 
trading rules (described in section III.1) with which they have to comply, and the process of 
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the experiment.  
Before moving on to the next step, the experimenter asks for clarifying questions and 
these are answered privately. More importantly, the experimenter reminds participants that 
they should do their best to maximise their profits during the experiment and the one who 
earns the highest profits in each group will win a large box of luxury chocolates.  
Step 2: Trading with identical information News A – the control stage 
After the introduction stage, participants are notified that they will have only one minute 
to read News A (Appendix I), to think about the possible price movements related to this 
piece of news, and to make decisions about their reactions toward the possible price 
movements. Then, participants are allowed to open the envelopes which are labelled “Version 
A, News A” (for the IMGroup) or “Version B, News A” (for the EXGroup). News A is 
composed of forty-five words of text and two figures. The text states a dividend declaration 
made by Company SDX and the figures show Company SDX’s annual dividend payments, 
basic earnings per share (basic EPS), and cash flows from operation (CFO) in the previous 
twelve years. Although they are labelled differently, the two versions of News A have exactly 
the same ingredients. Afterwards, participants start the simulation at the same time and trade 
according to their forecasts of News A. News A is the only piece of news released during this 
trading period and the price performance during this period is shown by the “First Round 
Trading” section in Figure 2. During this period, the opening price is £10 per share and the 
closing price is £10.22 per share, so that the period return is 2.2%. 
This trading stage is designed as a control stage. The differences which are potentially 
caused by participants’ personalities are controlled by examining their decisions and 
behaviour during this trading period. The null hypothesis is that IMGroup and EXGroup 
participants behave identically when they trade under identical news and an objective market 
environment. If this hypothesis is not rejected in this trading stage, any different behaviour 
found in the second trading stage should be mainly triggered by the different levels of 
information explicitness. 
Step 3: Two-minute short break and News B announcement 
At the end of the fifth minute, the share price stops moving in the following two-minute 
period (the “short break” section in Figure 2) between the two rounds of trading. During this 
break, participants are forbidden to trade any more. Instead, they read and analyse News B 
(“Version A, News B” for IMGroup and “Version B, News B” for EXGroup). The prototype 
for News B is BP’s oil spill accident in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. IMGroup’s Version A, 
News B (the implicit news) presents objective facts about the accident and the company’s 
financial position under the name “Company SDX” (Appendix II).1 EXGroup participants 
                                                 
1In this experiment, we try to reproduce the market situation after BP’s accident but we do not expect 
participants to speculate that the underlying company is BP.  However, as BP’s accident is so well known, the 
company name is replaced by Company SDX and a general word ‘accident’ is stated in News B rather than ‘oil 
spill’. 
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have every piece of information presented to IMGroup. However, in EXGroup’s Version B, 
News B (the explicit news), there is additional information presented by analysts’ forecasts 
regarding Company SDX’s motivation to re-tailor the dividend payment declared in News A 
during the first trading period. These forecasts are re-drafted from broadly read financial 
media which emphasise the rationale behind Company SDX cancelling its previously 
announced annual dividend payment, although dividend cancellation is commonly treated as 
an extreme negative signal in stock markets. At the end of this stage, the experimenter 
provides a hint to participants that the last piece of news – News C, which is about the final 
dividend decision made by the board of Company SDX – will be released in the “Information 
Window” of the trading simulation at the end of the 11th minute. 
By unpacking the dividend cancellation event through the presentation of several 
analysts’ forecasts, the actual event is repeatedly presented to participants and this unpacking 
approach is expected to raise its salience (Iselin, 1988). As a consequence, EXGroup 
participants are expected to have a higher level of confidence in the occurrence of dividend 
cancellation at the end of the experiment, which determines their final profits in this 
informationally efficient experimental market. Meanwhile, their trading behaviour is also 
expected to be affected accordingly. 
Step 4: Trading with implicit or explicit information– the experimental stage 
The market becomes active again at the end of the seventh minute. This second trading 
stage lasts for another five minutes. The price performance regarding News B is shown in the 
“Second Round Trading” section in Figure 2. Although this market is assumed to be 
informationally efficient, technically, participants have twenty seconds (the simulation gap) to 
enter their first order before the share price crashes as a reaction to the negative information 
presented in News B.2 If EXGroup participants are more convinced by the analysts’ forecasts 
about dividend cancellation and treat this as an extreme negative signal, compared with 
IMGroup’s outlook they might hold more pessimistic opinions of the future stock 
performance and might thus be prone to sell a larger than normal proportion of their holdings 
faster. If they move quickly enough to catch the twenty-second simulation gap, EXGroup 
participants might be able to win the chance of outperforming the IMGgroup. 
The share price will decrease gradually until the end of the tenth minute. The market then 
shows a trend of price recovery thereafter. The purpose of this V-shaped price pattern is to 
deliver an illusion of a price recovery to participants before the final news that “Company SDX 
announces that the £2 dividend is cancelled” (News C) is released at the eleventh minute and 
the shares experience another ‘price cliff’. This fake price recovery is designed to challenge 
participants’ confidence in the projections they have made according to News B. Supported 
by explicit news, EXGroup participants should be less affected by this trap. 
If participants do not believe that the experimental market is efficient (or they believe 
                                                 
2
 The rationality of this design is that even in a strong form efficient market where the price reflects a piece of 
newly released information immediately, the transaction scheme might still need a short time to reflect 
participants’ movements. 
  
 
7
that they are able to beat the market anyway) but they believe that the influence of the 
accident is fundamental so that they start to rebalance their portfolios, EXGroup participants 
may be more willing to trade than IMGroup participants (especially immediately after the 
market-shock). Similar reactions might be observed if participants believe that the 
experimental market is efficient but not in the strong form so they treat the given information 
as private information (because it is released via letters rather than through the trading 
simulation), and they need to rebalance their portfolios. On the other hand, if participants 
believe that the market is efficient, treat the given information as publicly available 
information, and consider rebalancing their portfolios, they might postpone their reactions and 
they may start to move during the manipulated V-shaped price recovery and EXGroup 
participants may place more orders than IMGroup participants. Furthermore, if participants 
believe the market to be efficient, their information is publicly available, and the effect of the 
accident is not fundamental so that there is no need to rebalance their portfolios, they may not 
be active in trading, both immediately after the market-shock and during the V-shaped price 
recovery. 
4. Analysis of Results 
As IMGroup and EXGroup participants have access to news accompanied by different 
levels of information explicitness, they are expected to draw differently judged probabilities 
of potential dividend-cut proportions so that they generate a different expected dividend-cut. 
Therefore, they might suffer different levels of stress or anxiety because their final goal of 
maximising profits is threatened by the negative information in News B. According to utility 
theory, dissimilarly judged probabilities might empower EXGroup and IMGroup participants 
to make different decisions. However, attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007)3 
suggests that the level of information explicitness may affect participants’ performance 
efficiency at a higher level of significance than their performance effectiveness. Therefore, 
extending the majority of previous studies which analyse investors’ performance based on 
returns, in this paper participants’ performance is measured by a set of factors that separates 
their performance effectiveness (returns, positions held, and first order volumes after the 
breaking news) from performance efficiency (reaction time of first order and numbers of 
orders placed to achieve the period returns). 
The participants’ position structures are analysed as a measure of performance 
effectiveness because they are not required to close their share positions at the end of each 
trading stage so that they may realise similar returns by bearing different levels of risk. As 
both returns and positions reflect the final results achieved by participants during a specific 
trading stage (performance effectiveness within a trading period) and they might have applied 
                                                 
3One of the five main hypotheses discussed by Eysenck et al. (2007, pp. 340) is that “anxiety impairs process 
efficiency to a greater extent than performance effectiveness on tasks involving the central executive”. 
“Performance effectiveness” refers to the quality of performance and “performance efficiency” measures the 
efforts devoted to generating a certain quality of performance (performance effectiveness to effort ratio). 
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a mood repair strategy (Steenbarger and Aderman, 1979)4 after the market-shock, their initial 
reactions towards a piece of breaking news (performance at a specific time point) are also 
analysed in this paper to evaluate their behaviour immediately after receiving the unexpected 
information. 
4.1 Performance Effectiveness during Trading Periods 
4.1.1 Returns 
Participants’ performance during this experiment is measured by three types of returns. 
They are the semi return, which reflects a participant’s profitability during the first trading 
stage (HR); the final return, which shows a participant’s profitability during the whole 
experiment integrating the first and the second trading stages (FR); and the semi-to-final 
return, which exhibits a participant’s profitability in the second trading stage only (HF). 
Generally, IMGroup and EXGroup participants earn positive returns during the first 
trading stage but lose money in the second trading stage. Compared with the market returns,5 
both experimental groups underperform the market during the first trading stage when the 
market fluctuates and report a positive period return. Individually (Table 1), by the end of the 
first trading stage (HR), IMGroup participants generate 1.19% less than the 2.2% market 
return (t-statistic = –17.456, p < 0.001); and EXGroup participants’ average return is 1.01% 
lower than the market return (t-statistic = –12.249, p < 0.001). However, during the second 
trading stage when the market collapses because of the bad news released by Company SDX, 
participants in both groups outperform the market. Considering participants’ performance 
during the second trading stage (FH) separately, on average, IMGroup participants lose 2.33% 
(t-statistic = 9.002, p < 0.001) and EXGroup participants lose 2.42% (t-statistic = 8.386, p < 
0.001) less than the market loss, which is 4.89%. Throughout the whole experiment period 
(FR), IMGroup participants’ average return is 1.23% higher than the –2.8% market return 
(t-statistic = 4.220, p < 0.001); and EXGroup participants’ average return is 1.48% higher 
(t-statistic = 4.497, p < 0.001). Participants underperform the market when the share price 
increases and outperform it when the share price decreases; this can be reasonably explained 
by the fact that they do not invest their entire wealth in stocks. 
[Take in Table 1 here] 
Although participants’ realised returns are significantly different from the market return, 
there is no statistical evidence to support a conclusion that their profitability after a shocked 
                                                 
4Steenbarger and Aderman (1997) support the mood-repair strategy by experiments and show that (1) with some 
opportunities for improvement, people tend to alter the situation trying to make it better so that they would feel 
better; however, (2) if it is impossible to improve the situation, they tend to bury their heads in the sand. 
5Market returns are determined by the pre-set prices at the end of the first and the second trading stages. At the 
beginning of the experiment, the share price is £10; at the end of the first trading stage, the share price is £10.22; 
and at the end of the second trading stage, the share price is £9.72. Therefore, the market semi return (HR) for 
the first trading stage is 2.2%, the market semi-to-final return for the second trading stage is -4.89% (HF), and 
the market final return for the whole experiment period is –2.80% (FR). 
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event is significantly driven by the explicitness of available news (Table 2). IMGroup and 
EXGroup realise comparable average returns at the end of the first trading stage (HR: SW6 
t-statistic = 1.634, p = 0.108), which supports their identical capability to earn profits under an 
identical market scenario. However, the explicit information exclusively available to 
EXGroup participants, which successfully predicts Company SDX’s decision to cancel the 
previously declared dividend payment (News C), does not lead to any difference in the 
average returns that are realised by EXGroup and IMGroup during the second trading stage 
(HF: SW t-statistic = 0.241, p = 0.832). As a consequence, IMGroup and EXGroup record 
similar average returns during the whole experiment (FR: SW t-statistic = 0.581, p = 0.564). 
[Take in Table 2 here] 
In summary, the null hypothesis that EXGroup participants benefit from the explicit 
information and earn a better return than IMGroup participants is rejected. Although 
EXGroup participants have more explicit information which supports the occurrence of 
dividend cancellation, this does not protect them from losing as much money as IMGroup 
participants. This is not consistent with some previous experiments on support theory which 
test participants’ decisions directly by assuming that the significant changes in judged 
probabilities lead to significant changes in decisions (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983; Johnson 
et al., 1993).7 However, this inconsistency might result from the fact that returns measure 
participants’ performance effectiveness, which might not be significantly affected by the 
stress changes triggered by different levels of information explicitness. From another 
perspective, the similar returns realised by IMGroup and EXGroup at the end of the second 
trading stage does not necessarily mean that they hold similar positions (exposure to a similar 
extent of risk) or that they have similar trading motivations. 
4.1.2 Positions Held 
Two components of participants’ assets at the end of each trading period – cash and share 
positions – are examined separately to consider whether the two groups suffer different levels 
of risk while realising similar period returns. If EXGroup participants are sufficiently 
convinced by the analysts’ predictions about dividend cancellation in News B, they should be 
more pessimistic than IMGroup participants. This might be reflected in their position 
structures by accumulating more risk-free cash at the end of the second trading period. 
[Take in Table 3 here] 
The risky component of participants’ assets – share positions – is measured by the 
number of shares that they hold at the end of each trading period. Statistical results are 
reported in Table 3. At the end of the control stage, during which they deal with an identical 
                                                 
6Satterthwaite-Welch t-tests are used to test whether two groups of data have same means, which allows for the 
existence of different variances. 
7
 There are other experiments that examine support theory but only analyse the impacts of information 
explicitness on individuals’ judged probabilities, but these studies fail to explain whether it affects their decisions 
and behaviour (Fischhoff et al., 1978; Redelmeier et al., 1995; Tversky and Koehler, 1994). 
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information scenario, IMGroup and EXGroup participants do not hold significantly different 
numbers of shares (SW t-statistic = 0.719, p = 0.475). Therefore, their similar share holdings 
at the end of the second trading stage (SW t-statistic = 0.704, p = 0.484) indicate that the level 
of information explicitness does not affect participants’ decisions about how many shares to 
accumulate during this trading period. Furthermore, if considering the second trading period 
only, the changes of share positions from the beginning to the end of this period are not 
significantly different between IMGroup and EXGroup (SW t-statistic =0.034, p = 0.973) 
either. Although participants are expected to be less willing to hold risky shares when they 
expect a weak market in the future, they might be reluctant to realise their losses in the second 
trading stage (Odean, 1998), which leads to comparable numbers of shares being held by 
EXGroup and IMGroup participants at the end. These two variables – participants’ first 
reaction times and first order volumes – will be examined in section IV.3. 
[Take in Table 4 here] 
The other component of participants’ portfolios in this manipulated stock market is the 
cash position in their trading accounts, but we find that the level of information explicitness of 
News B does not significantly affect participants’ decisions about how to distribute their 
assets between the risky shares and the risk-free cash so that, by the end of the second trading 
stage, they are exposed to identical levels of risk. 
4.2 Performance Efficiency during Trading Periods 
According to the results presented in the previous sections, EXGroup and IMGroup 
participants experience comparable performance effectiveness during a specific trading period. 
Therefore, placing more orders indicates that a group of participants is less efficient in 
generating a certain level of return. During the first trading stage, the total number of valid 
orders placed by IMGroup participants (Table 5) is smaller than the number placed by 
EXGroup participants, but the difference is only marginally significant (SW t-statistic = 1.740, 
p = 0.088). Nevertheless, when the valid buy and sell orders are analysed separately, IMGroup 
and EXGroup do not exhibit significant differences during the first trading stage (valid buy 
orders: SW t-statistic = 1.304, p = 0.198; valid sell orders: SW t-statistic = 1.658, p = 0.125). 
Therefore, we still assume that there is no intrinsic difference between IMGroup and 
EXGroup participants’ trading motivations when they face an identical market scenario. 
During the second trading stage when participants in different groups are dealing with news 
presented at different levels of information explicitness, this factor does not significantly 
affect the total number of valid orders placed by participants (SW t-statistic = 0.397, p = 
0.692). Dealing with more explicit information does not drive EXGroup participants’ trading 
motivations to significantly deviate from IMGroup participants’. Considering buy orders (SW 
t-statistic = 0.392, p = 0.697) and sell orders (SW t-statistic = 1.392, p = 0.170) separately, the 
level of explicitness does not affect participants’ buying or selling motivations either. 
 [Take in Table 5 here] 
During the first trading stage, News A is not negative, although some investors might 
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treat a continuous increase of the dividend payment as a positive signal while others might 
treat it neutrally. Nevertheless, the News B presented in the second trading stage (no matter 
how much detail it includes) is emotionally negative for investors. Besides EXGroup 
participants entering slightly fewer buy orders in the second trading stage (SW t-statistic 
=1.897, p = 0.064), the more negative sentiment presented by the news released during the 
second trading stage does not significantly influence the number of orders entered by 
participants in either IMGroup or EXGroup (Table 6). 
[Take in Table 6 here] 
4.3Performance at a Specific Time Point 
Participants’ first reactions to news in both trading stages are measured by two variables 
– how soon they enter their first order into the market (reaction time) and how many shares 
they are willing to trade in the first order (volumes). Because EXGroup participants are 
expected to be more disappointed by the accident revealed by News B, they are expected to 
move faster than IMGroup participants. As an effect of personalities, some participants might 
behave more aggressively than others so that they are prone to trade a larger number of shares 
per order.8 However, volumes are not analysed directly; instead, the first order volume to 
stage volume per trade ratio (reaction volume ratio FV/VpT) is analysed to test the null 
hypothesis that EXGroup participants’ reaction volume ratio more significantly deviates from 
one than that of IMGroup participants’. Furthermore, the stage volume per trade (VpT) of a 
certain trading stage does not include the first order. For example, if a participant places three 
orders in the first trading stage in total, the stage volume per trade for this participant during 
this stage is calculated according to the second and the third orders. 
4.3.1 Performance Efficiency – Reaction Time 
The less time that participants use to implement a decision, the more efficient they are. 
The results about the effects related to the level of information explicitness are reported in 
Panel A of Table 7. At the beginning of the first trading stage, when IMGroup and EXGroup 
are informed by exactly the same news story, they need a similar amount of time to enter their 
first orders (SW t-statistic = 0.242, p = 0.810), around half a minute from the beginning of the 
experiment. The level of information explicitness of News B significantly affects the time that 
participants spend before placing their first orders at the beginning of the second trading 
period (SW t-statistic = 2.451, p = 0.018). On average, EXGroup participants (24 seconds) 
start to move faster than IMGroup participants (65 seconds) after the negative market-shock 
in the second trading stage. Although there is a twenty-second simulation gap before the share 
price actually collapses because of the bad news, not every EXGroup participant is able to 
move fast enough to catch this time-gap and protect themselves from the price plunge. 
Specifically, 76% of IMGroup participants and 44% of EXGroup participants place their first 
                                                 
8
 For example, most participants trade shares on the basis of thousands of shares per trade, but some participants 
trade on the basis of hundreds or even tens of shares per trade.  
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order in the second trading stage after the simulation gap. 
[Take in Table 7 here] 
Considering the first order placed by participants at the beginning of each trading stage, 
another variable which is worth analysing is the sentiment presented by the news – the 
non-negative News A versus the negative News B. Regarding the choice of time to place their 
first orders in the market, the results (Panel B, Table 8) indicate that the effect of news 
sentiment is significant among IMGroup participants (SW t-statistic = 2.145, p = 0.037) but 
not among EXGroup participants (SW t-statistic = 0.909, p = 0.368). Inconsistent with their 
impaired performance efficiency during the trading period when it is measured by their 
mistakes, EXGroup participants become more efficient than their IMGroup peers at the 
moment when an unexpected market event breaks. In the second trading stage, most 
EXGroup participants (61.54%) place their first orders more quickly (on average 36.25 
seconds less) than in the first trading stage. However, a much smaller proportion of IMGroup 
participants (38.46%), who move faster in the second trading stage, reduce their reaction time 
by, on average, 17.5 seconds. Additionally, regarding the participants who move slower in the 
second trading stage than in the first, their average reaction time increases by 32.3 seconds 
and 68.69 seconds for EXGroup and IMGroup, respectively. 
4.3.2 Performance Effectiveness – Reaction Volume 
The reaction volume ratio FV/VpT evaluates participants’ performance effectiveness at 
the moment when they read the news. Participants’ FV/VpT ratios are analysed by using a “+” 
for a buy order and a “−” for a sell order to take the transaction direction into consideration 
(DRC (FV/VpT)) to evaluate whether their integrated trading decisions, which combine the 
directions of orders (buy or sell) and the volumes, are different at the two levels of 
information explicitness. A positive (negative) average DRC (FV/VpT) ratio indicates that 
abnormally more shares are bid (sold) by participants in their first orders.  
During the first trading stage, when participants in IMGroup and EXGroup have the 
same non-negative market information, the DRC (FV/VpT) ratios are significantly larger than 
zero (IMGroup: t-statistic = 4.187, p < 0.001; EXGroup: t-statistic = 2.390, p = 0.025). They 
are more willing to purchase shares than at other points of time in the first trading stage, 
which might reflect their positive outlook regarding future stock performance. Respectively, 
88.46% of IMGroup participants and 92.31% of EXGroup participants place bid orders as 
their first movement in the market. Indistinguishable DRC (FV/VpT) ratios (SW t-statistic = 
0.258, p = 0.798) in the first trading stage confirm that IMGroup and EXGroup participants’ 
first orders at the beginning of this trading stage are similar by integrating the volumes and 
the direction in which they trade (Panel A, Table 8). 
During the second trading stage, when participants have negative news, the DRC 
(FV/VpT) ratios turn significantly smaller than zero (IMGroup: t-statistic = –3.016, p = 0.006; 
EXGroup: t-statistic = –4.998, p < 0.001). This change is also shown by the significant effects 
caused by information sentiment on participants’ DRC (FV/VpT) ratios, which are shown in 
Panel B of Table 8 (IMGroup: SW t-statistic = 4.798, p < 0.001; EXGroup: SW t-statistic = 
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4.391, p < 0.001).The majority of IMGroup and EXGroup participants, 73.08% and 88.46% 
respectively, decide to sell their holdings. However, the DRC (FV/VpT) ratios are 
insignificantly different (the first panel of Table 8) between IMGroup and EXGroup at this 
stage (SW t-statistic = 0.179, p = 0.859), which shows that the level of information 
explicitness does not significantly affect participants’ integrated trading decisions in their first 
reaction orders after the negative-market shock.  
[Take in Table 8 here] 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
By operating a trading experiment concerning a negative market-shock in a manipulated 
stock market, this study addresses a core question: whether the level of information 
explicitness regarding an uncertain event powerfully drives investors’ decisions and behaviour. 
The results regarding participants’ performance are not completely consistent with previous 
experiments on support theory, which assume that judged probabilities significantly affect 
human behaviour so that they test subjects’ decisions directly and confirm the significant 
effects of level of information explicitness on behaviour (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983; 
Johnson et al., 1993). The results show that, through a trading period, explicit information 
marginally impairs participants’ performance efficiency so that they tend to make more 
mistakes. On the other hand, at the point when breaking news is available, it improves their 
performance efficiency since participants move faster as they react to a piece of unexpected 
bad news. However, there is no significant evidence to support the existence of different 
performance effectiveness, either during a period (returns and holding positions) or at a 
specific point in time (first order volume to stage volume per trade ratio), between those 
participants who have implicit or general information about a negative uncertain event and 
those who have explicit or detailed information about the same event. 
Although attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007) might explain the integrated 
result that the level of information explicitness of breaking bad news drives participants’ 
performance efficiency but not effectiveness, this might also be a result of participants’ 
reluctance to realise losses (Odean, 1998). With the explicit version of news, participants are 
able to make and implement decisions in a shorter time. However, this does not sufficiently 
prevent their stock positions moving from winners to losers when the share price collapses. 
There is a conflict between participants’ pessimistic perception of further losses and their 
intrinsic unwillingness to sell a loser, especially a large loser. In this experiment, they do 
evaluate their personal information and move accordingly when the winner threatens to 
become a loser in the future, but it seems that their rational forecasts are overwhelmed when 
the winner actually becomes a loser. They delay or stop selling their holdings afterwards and 
even start to re-build share positions at the end of the false price recovery period. As a 
consequence, they do not lose less money than those who receive the implicit version of the 
news about the same accident. 
Another conclusion from these experimental results is that participants might “herd” in 
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the market even in this experiment when they theoretically know nothing about who controls 
the market or other participants’ activities. In this experimental stock market, participants who 
have information at different levels of explicitness tend to take similar actions at different 
timing points. On average, EXGroup participants move faster than IMGroup participants but 
their decisions are fundamentally similar so that, superficially, the IMGroup imitates the 
EXGroup. A typical characteristic of herding is that groups of investors behave similarly in a 
sequence during a certain time period so that market prices exhibit a trend. Previous rational 
explanations of herding emphasise the role of personal information in investors’ 
decision-making processes and the assumption that herding investors intentionally mimic 
their predecessors (Welch, 1992; Devenow and Welch, 1996). However, this experiment 
conveys the likelihood that the imitating behaviour among different groups of investors might 
be implemented unintentionally, especially for the similarity of their first-placed order. In this 
experiment, when the negative market-shock breaks, participants have to evaluate their 
personal information and they have no idea about other participants’ decisions. They might be 
able to observe signals about price movements from market prices, but not the volumes. 
However, IMGroup and EXGroup participants’ trading decisions, combining the volumes 
they trade and whether they buy or sell, are similar. Accordingly, herding behaviour in 
financial markets might also be explained by another rational motivation: in a market where 
investors potentially have information at different level of explicitness because of information 
asymmetries among them (Chan et al., 2008; Ivashina and Sun, 2011), they might achieve 
convergent decisions by rationally analysing personal information independently but acting 
on it at different times. They might behave independently but appear as if they imitate 
predecessors.
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Appendix I: News A in the First Trading Stage 
Company SDX announced a £2 annual dividend per common share at 20:30 yesterday. 
Company SDX’s annual dividend payments, CFO and Basic EPS over the past 12 years are 
shown to participants.  
Appendix II: News B in the Second Trading Stage 
The “Version A, News B” for IMGroup is: 
One of Company SDX’s factories suffered an accident this morning which has caused 
serious environmental damage. Following an emergency meeting with the local government, 
Company SDX announced a brief agreement to create a £20 billion claim fund over the next 
three and a half years.  
As a consequence of this agreement, the current circumstances require the Board of 
Company SDX to consider modifying its dividend payment declared previously and the new 
dividend arrangement will be released next week.  
Company SDX’s business continues to perform well, with cash flows from operations 
(CFO) expected to exceed £30 billion this year. In addition, Company SDX has over £10 
billion of committed banking facilities. 
The Board stated that it remains strongly committed to the payment of future dividends 
and delivering long term value to shareholders.  
The “Version B, News B” for EXGroup is:  
One of Company SDX’s factories suffered an accident this morning which has caused 
serious environmental damage. Following an emergency meeting with the local government, 
Company SDX announced a brief agreement to create a £20 billion claim fund over the next 
three and a half years.  
As a consequence of this agreement, the current circumstances require the Board of 
Company SDX to consider modifying its dividend payment declared previously and the new 
dividend arrangement will be released next week.  
Company SDX’s business continues to perform well, with cash flows from operations 
(CFO) expected to exceed £30 billion this year. In addition, Company SDX has over £10 
billion of committed banking facilities. 
The Board stated that it remains strongly committed to the payment of future dividends 
and delivering long term value to shareholders.  
Investment bankers’ viewpoints:  
Person X, Chief Analyst at a leading bank, said: “Company SDX will surely cancel the 
£2 dividend in an effort to mitigate the negative publicity from this accident.” 
Person Y, Head of Equities at another leading bank, added that the Local Justice 
Department might take legal action to force the Company SDX cancel its £2 dividend.  
Person Z, co-founder of a securities firm, believes that Company SDX would not be able 
to maintain a sufficient liquidity level in the company if it did not cancel the £2 dividend.  
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Table 1 Participants’ Performance Verses Market Performance 
 IMGroup EXGroup 
 HR FR FH HR FR FH 
Group Return Market Return –1.19% 1.23% 2.33% –1.01% 1.48% 2.42% 
t-statistic –17.456*** 4.220*** 9.002*** –12.249*** 4.497*** 8.386*** 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
A t-test is used to analyse whether participants’ returns significantly differ from zero; 
*** refers to the variable being significantly different from zero at the 1% level.  
 
Table 2: Participants’ Returns 
 Group Mean Standard Deviation t-statistic P-value 
Semi Return (HR) 
IMGroup 1.01% 0.004 
1.634 0.108 
EXGroup 1.19% 0.004 
Semi-to-Final Return (HF) 
IMGroup -2.56% 0.013 
0.214 0.832 
EXGroup -2.47% 0.015 
Final Return (FR) 
IMGroup -1.57% 0.015 
0.581 0.564 
EXGroup -1.32% 0.017 
The SW t-test is used to analyse whether participants’ return is significantly affected by information explicitness. 
 
Table 3 Share Positions 
 Group Mean (No. of 1000 Shares) Standard Deviation t-statistic P-value 
At the End of the First Trading Stage 
IMGroup 9.553 6.277 
0.719 0.475 
EXGroup 8.337 6.260 
At the End of the Second Trading Stage 
IMGroup 7.088 6.565 
0.704 0.484 
EXGroup 5.800 6.991 
Difference Between the First and the Second 
Trading Stage 
IMGroup 2.465 8.254 
0.034 0.973 
EXGroup 2.537 7.318 
 
Table 4 Cash Positions 
 Group Mean (£10000) Standard Deviation t-statistic P-value 
At the End of the First Trading Stage 
IMGroup 10.252 6.481 
1.177 0.244 
EXGroup 12.337 6.653 
At the End of the Second Trading Stage 
IMGroup 13.181 6.576 
0.998 0.323 
EXGroup 14.880 6.030 
Change During the Second Trading Stage 
IMGroup 2.929 8.519 
0.179 0.859 
EXGroup 2.543 7.422 
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Table 5 Valid Orders – Information Explicitness 
   Mean (No. of Orders) Standard Deviation t-statistic P-Value 
The First Trading Stage 
Buy 
IMGroup 3.815 1.942 
1.304 0.198 
EXGroup 4.500 1.881 
Sell 
IMGroup 2.481 1.827 
1.558 0.125 
EXGroup 3.385 2.368 
Total 
IMGroup 6.296 2.920 
1.740* 0.088 
EXGroup 7.885 3.670 
The Second Trading Stage 
Buy 
IMGroup 3.704 4.017 
0.392 0.697 
EXGroup 3.346 2.465 
Sell 
IMGroup 3.185 2.185 
1.392 0.170 
EXGroup 4.077 2.465 
Total 
IMGroup 6.889 5.430 
0.397 0.692 
EXGroup 7.423 4.310 
* refers to the difference being significant at the 10% level. 

Table 6 Valid Orders – Information Sentiment 
   Mean (No. of Orders) Standard Deviation t-statistic P-Value 
IMGroup 
Buy 
First Trading Stage 3.815 1.942 
0.129 0.898 
Second Trading Stage 3.704 4.017 
Sell 
First Trading Stage 2.481 1.827 
1.284 0.205 
Second Trading Stage 3.185 2.185 
Total 
First Trading Stage 6.296 2.917 
0.499 0.620 
Second Trading Stage 6.889 5.430 
EXGroup 
Buy 
First Trading Stage 4.500 1.881 
1.897* 0.064 
Second Trading Stage 3.346 2.465 
Sell 
First Trading Stage 3.385 2.368 
1.033 0.307 
Second Trading Stage 4.077 2.465 
Total 
First Trading Stage 7.885 3.670 
0.416 0.679 
Second Trading Stage 7.423 4.310 
* refers to the difference being significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 7 First Reactions –Reaction Time  
   Mean (seconds) Standard Deviation t-statistic P-value 
Panel A 
Level of Explicitness 
The First Trading 
Stage 
IMGroup 28.96 22.908 
0.242 0.810 
EXGroup 30.84 31.452 
The Second Trading 
Stage 
IMGroup 65.280 81.487 
2.451** 0.018 
EXGroup 23.680 23.688 
Panel B 
Information Sentiment 
IMGroup 
First Trading Stage 28.960 22.908 
2.145** 0.037 
Second Trading Stage 65.280 81.487 
EXGroup 
First Trading Stage 30.840 31.452 
0.909 0.368 
Second Trading Stage 23.680 23.688 
** refers to the difference being significant at the 5% level. 

Table 8 First Reactions – Reaction Volume Ratio (FV/VpT) 
   Mean Standard Deviation t-statistic P-value 
Panel A 
Information Explicitness 
The First 
Trading Stage 
IMGroup 0.653 0.795 
0.258 0.798 
EXGroup 0.743 1.585 
The Second 
Trading Stage 
IMGroup –0.735 1.242 
0.179 0.859 
EXGroup –0.787 0.803 
Panel B 
Information Sentiment 
IMGroup 
First Trading Stage 0.653 0.795 
4.798*** 0.000 
Second Trading Stage –0.735 1.242 
EXGroup 
First Trading Stage 0.743 1.585 
4.391*** 0.000 
Second Trading Stage –0.787 0.803 
*** refers to the difference being significant at the 1% level. 
 
Figure 1 Price Trend of Company SDX's Share Price 
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